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MEASURING PROTECTION OVER TIME.   
REVENUE AND PROTECTIVE PRODUCTS  










This paper shows the relevance of the strong and changing presence of the so-called 
fiscal products throughout  European trade history, the bigger index number problems in 
periods and countries with higher levels and shares of manufacture tariffs in total 
imports and the different association between tariffs and growth according to 
development heterogeneity and the tariff average used. Evidence showed in this paper  
appear quite contrary to Bairoch traditional hypothesis on the positive role that 
protection played to foster Continental Europe industrialization before First War World. 
Conclusions suggests caution in the use of the conventional average tariffs and advises 
the estimation of  alternative  manufacture, agrarian and fiscal tariff average by 
countries as a necessary contribution for the better defined tariff growth debate. 
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The relation between trade policy and growth is a fundamental question that require 
an empirical evidence answer. Measuring the level of protection in an economy through time 
and across countries is the main problem with which researchers struggle when trying to 
answer this question. Economic historians and development economist still depend on the 
traditional and  theoretically poorly based measures of protection as the best available 
instruments to study empirically the relation between trade and growth in the long run. 1 
Trade weighted average tariff is the best known measure to isolate tariff policies from other 
policies and very convenient as a time series index of protection because easily calculated as 
the ratio of tariff revenues over import values 2.  
 The motivation of this work is the abundant recent empirical research using  average 
tariffs to establish correlation equations between growth and trade policy in the long run3.  
Positive correlation across countries found between tariffs average and growth during the 
years of return to protection(1870-1913) by O´Rourke (2000), Clemens-Williamson (2001) 
and Vamvakidis (2002) strengthened the traditional good reputation between protection and 
growth at the end of XIX century4.  Bairoch work was based on a “post hoc ergo propter hoc” 
argument connecting depression with free trade and economic growth with protectionism. 
                                                           
1
 .- Most of the theoretically founded indices of protection developed recently are impracticable when using time 
series. Leamer and others index of protection based on a Hekscher-Ohlin empirical model or the CGE 
(Computable General Equilibrium) models, require knowledge of the basic production structure and when the 
imput-ouput data is available it is feasible only for some isolated years. For a Heckscher –Ohlin  model with 
some empiricall asumption on factor endowments see :  Leamer (1988) and for a comparative historical study in 
1913 EstevaDeordall (1996). A CGE model derived from and imput-output coeficients for Itlaly in 1911 see 
Federico O´Rourke (1999). Even the most simplified GCE models as the Anderson TRI ( Trade Restrictiveness 
Index ), which does not require knowing the production structure of the country, rely on import and tariff data 
disagregated enough to make the index only empirically feasible for benchmark comparison. For the theoretic of 
the TRI model see Anderson_Neary (1996), and Anderson (1998) for a comparative study in 1989-1990. A 
critic of the model in an economic-history context O’Rourke (1997). Application of the TRI in economic history 
see Federico-Tena (1997) for Italy and Tena (1998) for Spain. 
 
2
 Edwards(1993) still  uses imports-export to GDP ratios to obtain a classification of the openness of the 
countries for the second half of the XX century. The equilibrium ratio level of this measure relies on the size 
and changes in demand structure trade elasticities that make this measure endogenous and unconvincing  for the 
long run. For the post war years review of the empirical studies on trade policy and economic growth see 




 There are many reasons for the use  of tariff average as protection index in the long run.   Edwards (1998)  
runs regression of total productivity growth on nine alternative indicators of openness, only three results are 




 “ Although import substitution policies have gradually lost their shine over the postwar period, their reputation 
has remained  intact for the late nineteenth century”  Irwin (2002), p.1. Notably Bairoch (1976, 1989, 1996) 
praise protectionism as instrumental  to the development of late XIXth century Continental Europe.  
  3 
Previous works show new evidence supporting Bairochs hypothesis and suggest causality 
between higher tariffs levels and growth.  Nevertheless these recent works provide scarce 
information to interpreting the tariff mechanism causation to growth. The main suggestion of 
this paper is that total tariff average indices provide not only scarce information, or important 
bias to interpreting the tariff mechanism causation on growth but  lead to erroneous 
conclusions.  
This paper discus three criticism that make the use of average tariff to establish causal 
relationship between tariff and growth specially vulnerable. First, the well known “index 
number problem” of the tariff import weighted average that usually downward biases the 
most protected goods import weight. The extent of the bias depends on the height of the 
current tariff rate and on the elasticity of imports of the most important goods 5 . A country 
which imposes prohibitive tariffs on all goods but one (imported free) would appear less 
protectionist than another which raises a uniform 5 per cent duty.  
Second, there are some luxury consumer products which were traditionally costumed  
for “fiscal reasons” in Europe specially during the prewar years, because their low elasticity 
of demand allowed for increases in tariffs and more revenue 6. The inclusion of this kind of 
products on protection measures hinged on the specification of demand and in particular on 
how exotic products should be treated. The revenue tariff is related mainly to consumer 
income and government revenue and its economic effect is more similar to a “sales tax” over 
certain luxury products such as tobacco or gasoline. In theory there are no pure fiscal tariffs 
neither pure protective ones. However those which have a small elasticity of demand (fiscal 
tariff) have much lower impact on welfare and import substitution than those with high 
elasticity 7. The strong presence of the so-called fiscal products and their changing presence 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
  
5




 .- This is only a general statement as protective tariffs can also increment  revenue  tariff.  Irwin (1998) 
measures import elasticity for the USA at the end of 19th century and shows how higher tariffs in protective 
products can raise additional revenue. strictly speaking it depends on the import demand elasticity and if the 
previous level of the tariff is below the revenue maximizing tariff.  
 
7
 .- O’Rourke(1997) present this argument in the context of the discussion of the applicability of the Anderson 
TRI CGE model to resolve  the Nye-Irwin debate. He concludes that when there are a high proportion of low 
elasticity demand products in the imports demand of a given country, the specification of the import demand 
elasticity’s are crucial to the determination of the impact of the import tariff structure on the welfare of an 
economy. 
 
  4 
throughout trade history makes this point important in the analysis of the comparative 
evolution of the international trade policies specially in Europe.  
The third is an extension of the previous criticism and is related with the use of the 
tariff average to advocate the positive role of import tariffs to promote growth (Bairoch 
(1977), (1989), (1994) O´Rourke(2000), Clements-Williamson(2001) ). For Continental 
Europe this mean that, at least for the period 1870–1913, that tariffs should be perceived as a 
a successful policy to foster industrialization. European economic growth at the end of the 
XIX century imply foster industrialization, and this follow that tariff should encourage 
structural change from agriculture to industry to raise output per worker this may imply lower 
agricultural protection and higher industrial tariffs8.  This paper test the relevance of this 
critics on the use of tariff average either for the tariff growth debate or the clarification of the 
comparative European commercial policy history during the XIX century.  
The first section, discuses Nye´s provocative statement of a more free trade France 
than  UK before 1880 pointing out the relevance of the fiscal share in costume revenue tariff 
average for that debate. The second section estimates the level and changing share of fiscal 
products  in other European countries and their relevance for the European comparative 
commercial policy histories in the last quarter of 19th century. The third section discuses the 
index number problem in the conventional tariff average and tries to measure the import 
contraction tariff elasticity for Spain and Italy and its relevance during the years of return to 
protection. The fourth section investigates the causation mechanism between tariffs and 
growth finding different results between industrial and total tariffs correlation with growth. 
The concluding remarks show the relevance of the strong and changing presence of the so-
called fiscal products throughout  European trade history, the bigger index number problems 
in periods and countries with higher levels and shares of manufacture tariffs in total imports 
and the different association between tariffs and growth according to development 
heterogeneity and the tariff index used. All this evidence suggests caution in the use of the 
conventional average tariffs and advises the estimation of  alternative  manufacture, agrarian 
and fiscal tariff average by countries as a necessary contribution for the better defined tariff 
growth debate. 
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1.- A cautionary tale: fiscal British versus protective France 
The share of revenue products in the nominal protection average index is part of  a 
recent debate about the comparative experience with trade policy in France and United 
Kingdom during the 19th century (see Nye (1991, 1993) and the debate Irwin-Nye (1993) ). 
Nye’s main proposition is that the comparative nominal protection average index of both 
countries support the argument of more free trade in France than in UK, especially between 
1840 and 1880. That statement is reinforced testing average tariff index number problems 
applying the tariff rates by commodity class to the import distribution of another period close 
to free trade. After some other qualifications on average tariff robustness for England and 
France Nye refuses to accept that there is an economic argument to establish distinction  
between fiscal tariffs and less protective in the United Kingdom and manufacture tariffs and 
more protective in France. Protection bias either in England and France was designed in 
defense of non-comparative advantage products.  Irwin argues that the big share of revenue 
tariffs in UK imports in that period is the main responsible of the upward bias of the British 
tariff average. In United Kingdom fiscal tariffs taxed only exotic products not produced in 
England as “an extension of the domestic excise system, levied only on a select number of 
commodities to raise fiscal revenue without discriminating against foreign goods in favor of 
domestic goods” 9. That would be the case of brandies or even beer, for which an excise duty 
that had to be paid and offset the wine duties.  Nevertheless we do not know how much of the 
difference between the higher British average tariff and the lower French level is due to the 
presence of revenue products. Irwin’s reply  uses good qualitative arguments but no 
consistent quantitative evidence.  The share of the revenue tariffs on the average index 
emerges as the main contrasting point in the representation of  such  different stories.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
8
 This proposition is suggested also in Irwin (2002)  
9
 See Irwin (1993), p.  
  6 
Sources: see Appendix 1 
 
 
Figures  1, 2 and 3 offer visualized quantitative evidence of the different positions 
given in the Nye-Irving debate with the purpose to shed some light on the importance of 
fiscal products in British and French protectionist histories rather than to resolve the debate.  
Nye argues that  exotic stuffs and beverages in England  were used as an important source of 
revenue, but those tariffs induce protection for direct and indirect substitutes. Fiscal tariffs  
distorted domestic production and consumer welfare in Britain , as the protection of textiles 
manufactures did in France. On the basis of this argument,  Nye insists that Figure 1 
represents  acceptable quantitative evidence of the comparative commercial policy history of 
both countries and supports the provocative argument of more free trade in France than 
England even after the English corn law repeal in the 1840´s and before the turn to protection 
in France in the 1880´s.  
 Figure 1 
 Average Tariffs Rates:  (Tariff Revenue as a Fraction of All Imports ) in  











































United Kingdon (Average Tariff) 
France  (Average Tariff ) 
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Sources: see Appendix 1 
 
Figure 2, makes explicit the conventional and well-accepted argument defended 
recently by Irwin.  British protection from the 1840´s on, was mainly fiscal. Leaving out the 
English main fiscal products in dispute, there is no question about the representation of the 
traditional view of a comparatively free trade England with protectionist France. Irwin insists 
on the fact that the English tariffs on wine and spirits were “carefully constructed to avoid 
protecting domestic producers”(sic)10 . Tariffs on wine and foreign spirits were required to 
allow British domestic producers of beer and spirit, who were taxed with an excise, to 
compete, on equal terms, with these imported foreign beverages. So tariffs on brandies and 
even on wines did not have relevant protective effects on domestically produced beverages 
and should be treated as fiscal products like other  exotic colonials imported as tea, sugar, 
tobacco and coffee. 
                                                           
10
 Irwin (1993) p.146. This argument is part of a well-accepted fiscal history in England. For a very recent 
British fiscal history see  Martin Daunton (2001). In a summary of it main conclusion(see Dauton  (june 2001): 
Dauton insists  that:  “excise duties were, “voluntary” , falling on goods such as tobacco or spirits which the tax 
payers could do without – they might even be morally suspect narcotics. Import duties were limited to 
commodities which could not be produced at home (such as sugar or tea), so that they did not offer any 
Figure 2 
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   Neither Irwin nor Nye pay too much attention to the growing share of French fiscal 
products in  total tariff revenues during the period in question. The share of colonial products 
like cocoa, coffee, and sugar in France represented  more than a  40 percent of the average 
tariff rate index in the second half of the 1840`s  and grew over 60 and 70 per cent in the 
1860´s and 1870´s.  So comparatively, the trend of France’s nominal protection was strongly  
influenced by  fiscal tariff products too. A consistent comparison between both countries 
suggests measuring the incidence of revenue products in the French average tariff too.  
Figure 3 does this, first, excluding the respective four main revenue products in each 
country and second, removing spirits and wine, the two controversial English excise taxed 
products. The first exercise would show the parallel  free trade histories for both countries 
during the 1840´s. France would be more liberal than England before the abolition of Corn 
Law.  The famous liberalizing British decade of the 1840s leaves the average tariff level 
slightly lower than that of its rival before 1860´s but both countries would show quite similar 
levels before the 1880`s.  After the Cobden –Chevalier Treaty France’s liberalizing efforts  
would allow to outdo slightly the British free trade performance, during almost two decades, 
before the 1880s return to protection. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
protection to domestic producers, with the danger of distorting the allocation of resources in the economy.”, 
p.10  
  9 
Sources: see Appendix 1 
 The second UK index presents better the conventional well known commercial 
comparative history defended by Irwin. The controversial wine and spirits (excise taxed) 
imports and revenues are removed from the average tariff.  Peel’s efforts of the 1840´s  would 
reduce the British tariffs average  in a significant way both in absolute terms and in 
comparison with  France’s average. France followed England tariff reductions in the 1850´s 
and the Cobden-Chevalier 1860´s decade shows a faster  liberalization in France than in 
England but England would remain in the premier free trade position all along the XIX 
century.  
Wine, rum and brandy tariffs and the excise level of their substitutes beer and 
domestic appear crucial in this debate. Figure 9 (Appendix A) add some evidence to the 
debate estimating the ad valorem spirit tariff ratio and its respective ad valorem excise ratio 
over production from 1840 to 1913. The spirit tariff fell to half in 1840 but still during the 
1840´s decade was maintained slightly over the excise ratio. Only in the second half of the 
1850´s this trend change abruptly  and in the next two decades the excise tax became twice 
higher than the tariff protection of the sector. Figure 10 (Appendix A) pays attention to the 
Figure 3
Nominal Protection(Average Tariff Revenue as a Fraction of Total Revenue)  Without Main
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  10 
relation between wine tariff and the beer excise ratio. The wine tariff was more than four fold 
the ad valorem excise ratio over beer, their main substitute produced in United Kingdom. 
The excise was reduced strongly in the second half of the 1850´s in correspondence 
with the Cobden-Chevalier negotiations. In the next decades the wine tariff appears always 
close to double the beer excise. In consequence evidence on tariffs and excise supports a 
reasonable compromise between both positions. Wine tariff seems independent of excise beer 
and may have had influence on beer domestic production, so it may be considered  protective. 





Figure 4 offers this compromise. Spirits are excluded because excise taxes offset 
protection over national brandies production (as Irwin suggests). But wine is included and 
considered  a protective tariff , because apparently the beer excise tax did not compensate the 
wine tariff at all (as Nye insists).  The new British index reproduces mainly the well-
established British commercial history. The 1840´s that saw the beginning of a true revolution 
in commercial history. Earlier moves towards freer trade had been conditioned by an 
 
Figure 4  
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insistence on reciprocity, but from 1840s on policy was determined unilaterally. The Repeal 
of the Corn Law in 1846 is shown by the index as a radical change even if tariffs reduction 
appear from the beginning of the 1840s. French tariffs reductions started later, at the turn of 
the decade, and were less dramatic than in England. During the 1850´s French tariff levels 
almost double the British ones and convergence is only significant after the 1860 treaty and 
steadily persists until 1870. French  reactions against liberalization appear early in the 1870s 
and were progressive until the end of the 1880s with an acceleration in the early 1890s with 
the new Meline tariff law.  
O’Rourke arrived at similar conclusions about the Nye-Irving debate using a CGE 
model: “If wine, rum and brandy are not treated as exotic, but are assumed to be as 
substitutable with British goods as imported wheat or timber, then Nye is spectacularly 
right.”(p. 180).  O’Rourke did  not take into account exotic products that were excise taxed or 
not. Evidence on fiscal revenue and excise taxed makes Nye history  less spectacular, and 
more reconcilable with the main stream of the well-established British trade history.  
Nevertheless, Nye’s provocative statement is really a cautionary tale suggestive for other 
histories of commercial policy and  push us to pay more attention to the fiscal products in 
costume revenue when tariff average are used to study commercial history through time or in 
comparative history.  
2.- Revenue and Protective Tariffs in  19th Century Trade Policy History  
Generally speaking, fiscal tariff commodities, are those which had no direct domestic 
substitutes11.  Without demand elasticity specification we will make the decision to consider 
fiscal products, for our purpose, as the highest revenue commodities with no obvious 
domestic substitutes.  The revenue tariff is related mainly to consumer income and 
government revenue and its economic effect is more similar to a “sales tax” over certain 
luxury products such as tobacco or gasoline. In theory there are no pure fiscal tariffs neither 
pure protective ones. However those which have a small elasticity of demand (fiscal tariff) 
                                                           
 
11
 .- The United States protectionism history is a paradigmatic case of a strong government revenue dependence 
on tariff revenue before 1914.  Nevertheless, revenue tariffs taxed products were mainly domestically produced. 
Because of its extension and variety of climes were perhaps an exceptional producer of almost every “exotic” 
consumed product ( perhaps the only exception was cane sugar (only produced in small quantities in Louisiana). 
Irwin (1998) show the different behavior of the general index with and without sugar in the general index but 
not so  significant as we show here for some European countries.  
 
  12 
have much lower impact on welfare and import substitution than those with high elasticity 12. 
The assumption is that a low elasticity of demand is a consequence of  non existence of clear 
domestic substitutes (elasticity of substitution close to zero) , even if it depends also on home 
market size and stage of development (see O`Rourke (1997),  Irwin(1998), Krueger (1997). 
In consequence an average tariff  without fiscal tariffs would probably represent a better 
index of  protection than the conventional one in which they are included. We offer some 
evidence on how exotic products without obvious substitutes such as sugar, cocoa, tea or 
coffee represented a significant fraction of European imports and the relevance of this 






                                                           
12
 .- O’Rourke(1997) present this argument in the context of the discussion of the applicability of the Anderson 
TRI CGE model to resolve  the Nye-Irwin debate. He concludes that when there are a high proportion of low 
elasticity demand products in the imports demand of a given country, the specification of the import demand 
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Sources:  Appendix 1. United Kingdom (4 fiscal): tea, sugar, tobacco, coffee, (6 fiscal): four fiscal plus 
wine and spirits. France (4 fiscal):cocoa, coffee, sugar and petroleum. Germany (3 fiscal): coffee, tobacco and 
petroleum.  Italy  ( 3fiscal): sugar, coffee, petroleum. Spain  ( 4 fiscal) sugar coffee, code and petroleum.    
 
 
Figure 4 shows the changing share of the main fiscal tariff average on total tariff 
average in some European countries throughout the XIX century 13.  The tariff rate on fiscal 
products represent for the United Kingdom (4fiscal) between 40 to 80 per cent of total tariff 
average in a growing cyclical trend from the 1820´s to First World War. In the case of France 
this share increase from 35 per cent in the 1830`s to a share of 70 per cent at the end of the 
1870´s to go down around 40 per cent at the turn of the XIX century. Germany, on the 
contrary, shows a more moderate and constant influence of the fiscal rate on the total average 
with a cyclical share in the range of 40-30 per cent. The share trend of the main fiscal tariff 
average in the total tariff average for peripheral countries like Spain and Italy is also quite 
                                                           
13
 That means the difference between the total tariff average with and without fiscal duties as a percentage of the 
last. This represent the changing share influence of fiscal products on total conventional nominal tariff along the 
time and between countries.  
FIGURE 4
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  14 
shocking with a range that goes from  – 5(lower than the average) to 20 for the first to 20-60 
for the second.  
Sources: Appendix 1 
 
On the basis of these changing shares of fiscal products in the total average we can get 
a different perception of the comparative protectionist history in Europe. The conventional 
Bairoch (1989) history about tariffs for the period of  “return to protection” of France and 
Germany between 1880 to 1913 is only confirmed partially if we do not take into account the 
fiscal product share in the average rate, as we did in previous section with the France and 
Britain. 
 The conventional tariff average of Figure 5 shows how Germany did not lead the 
early return to protection in Continental Europe. France’s comparative reaction appears at 
least so early and severe as the German one, reaching a significantly higher level than 
Germany during the first half of 1890`s. After the second half of the 1890´s and until First 
World War, protection was decreasing, because price increase reduced the level of ad-















1880 1884 1888 1892 1896 1900 1904 1908 1912
GERMANI
FRANCE
  15 
Sources: Appendix 1 
 
An alternative history appears, when the exotic products are left out of the average, as 
shown by figure 6.  Germany’s early return to protection in the 1880´s decade caused by the 
steady reinforcement of its famous July 1879 tariff law appears clearly identified, with levels 
almost twofold of the French ones at the end of decade. Only in the next two years that follow 
the respective French tariffs laws of 1892 and 1910, French average appear higher than the 
Germans. Also in this case, the German average would offer superior levels than its French 
counterpart following better the qualitative perceptions of the literature for the period of the 
return of protection. 
The last cautionary tale on the use of fiscal products on tariff average affects the 
commercial history of two peripheral countries like Spain and Italy. Italy during the twenty 
years after unification was a free trade country, a shorter and doubtful free trade period for 
the Spanish case initiated in the second half of the 1860´s. Spain’s new tariff of July 1877 
introduced for the first time the double tariff that was to be adopted by many other European 
tariff laws in the following years. Italy tariff law of 1878, even if it was moderate, was 
previous to the 1879 German tariff. Most scholars date the real beginning of protection in 
Italy with the approval of the new tariff of 1887 and in Spain with the Canovas Law of 1891.  
The Italian 1887 tariff implemented a new a duty on wheat and manufactures that caused an 
Figure 6












1880 1884 1888 1892 1896 1900 1904 1908 1912
GERMANY
FRANCE
  16 
open trade-war with France, then Italy main trading-partner. The 1887 tariff lasted officially 
more than thirty years with some minor interventions, ad-hoc laws, and trade treaties. From 
the second half of the 1890´s the level of protection was decreasing as price increases reduced 
the level of the ad valorem equivalent of the (specific) duties.  Spain’s protectionist tariff of 
1892 provoked also a tariff war with France and Germany. In addition the loss of her 
remaining colonies (Cuba, Philippines and Puerto Rico) in 1898 reduced exports and induced 
a strong pessimism that led to pressures for increased protectionism which resulted in the new 
tariff law of 190614.  
 
 
Sources: Appendix 1 
 
On the basis of this qualitative evidence historians had widely assumed that both 
countries had a similar protectionist histories. A look at the comparative conventional ratio of 
total tariffs incomes on import value in figure 7 partially confirms this conventional wisdom 
at least for the years of the return of protection. Protection increase in Italy from the late 
                                                           
14
 See Tena (2000) 
Figure 7
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1870´s on but it is not until the late 1880´s that the tariffs average would arrive at a level 
similar to the Spanish average because of a linear constant protection increase until the turn 
of the century. In Italy the level of the tariff average decreased from the turn of the century to 
First World War in contrast with the stabilization of the Spanish average in the same years. 
The Spanish protectionist index does not fit with the idea of a temporary return to protection 
as the Italian one and it appears more as a structural cyclical feature of the Spanish economy 
from the second half of the 1870´s. Nevertheless from the second half of the 1880´s decade to 
the first years of the turn of the century Italy would show superior average tariff levels than 
the Spain. 
During the years of “return of protection” around half of total costume revenue in Italy 
was yielded by three products sugar, coffee and oil and in Spain three main revenue products 
(cod, coffee and oil) yielded around 1/5 of total (total colonials ¼).  As Figure 4 shows the 
weight of fiscal tariffs in the total average tariffs was much higher in Italy than in Spain and 
the trend of that weight was practically the inverse during these years.  
 
Sources: see Appendix 1 
 
Figure 8







1860 1864 1868 1872 1876 1880 1884 1888 1892 1896 1900 1904 1908 1912
SPAIN (- 3 FISCAL)
ITALY (-3 FISCAL)
  18 
Figure 8 shows that, without its three main revenue products, Italian free-trade period 
can be clearly extended until the 1887 tariff law (with no years above 6 percent). The increase 
of protection was much less impressive than when fiscal products are included, with higher 
peaks around a 10% during the 1890´s. This means that one cannot understand the structure 
of Italian duties without taking into account the fiscal side of the issue. Italian fiscal duties` 
increased relevance is noted from the end of the 1870´s and influences the significant custom 
revenues growth of the following years without affecting imports substantially. Fiscal 
protection accounted for about three quarters of the rise in total protection from 1877 to 1897 
(Federico and Tena 1998, Table1). In Spain the main fiscal duties were imposed after the 
1898 Cuban’s war, following the fiscal reform of Fernandez Villaverde in 1899, when fiscal 
tariff revenues of the so-called “Colonials” were increased notably. Nevertheless, even if 
fiscal products affected domestic colonial product prices, they do not alter significantly the 
trend and the level of the Spanish total protectionism, because of their lower share in total 
imports. The comparative nominal protection average index, for the crucial decade of 1890, 
shows a very similar increase in aggregate protection for both countries. But Italian protection 
increment was mainly fiscal and the Spanish mainly due to tariff increase in manufactures 
(Federico-Tena (1998), Tena (1999) 
 
3.- Manufacture versus fiscal tariffs and the classic index problem. 
  The tariff average index    NTt = 
i=1
n∑  (Qit *Tit) /
i=1
n∑  (Qit*Pit)  [1]   is a Paasche index 
that weights individual tariffs by the respective imports in each year. So a classic index 
number problem arises because when Ti is increased Mi declines. This mean that, the 
conventional average tariff NT usually biases the results downwards and the extent of the 
bias depends on the level of the duties and on the elasticity of imports of the most important 
goods.  
An alternative index would be the UNT. Which does not weight at all (simple average 
of duties) UNT=
i=1
n∑  Ti / n  [2]  and assumes that each item had the same share in 
consumption, which is clearly implausible.  The UNT  bias is (roughly) inversely 
proportional to the number of products (Tumlir-Till 1971), which depends on the layout of 
trade statistics. Usually, they are more detailed for manufactures, which therefore may be 
  19 
given an excessive weight. The RNT,  the composition of trade of the same country in a 
previous year, as suggested by McCloskey (1980), RNTt =
i=1
n∑ (Qit-1*Tit) / 
i=1
n∑ (Qit-1*Pit-1)  [3]  
which is conceptually equivalent to a Laspeyres price index, exactly as the NT is a Paasche 
price index (with current price weighting) is possibly the most appealing measure, provided it 
were possible to find a “free-trade” year close enough to the relevant one. However, this 
condition is hardly met in historical research, as the protectionist policy lasted for decades, 
while the economies were changing.  
Therefore, there is no ideal solution as yet to the problem  The "true" level of 
protection at any given point in time, can not be ascertained.  The best practical compromise 
seems to be to compute all the measures and assess their consistency.  This strategy yields a 
further bonus, as the comparison between different measures provides an insight on the 
causes of changes in the level of tariff average (NT-NTt-1), before and after a tariff law 
change. Usually, the variations are attributed to changes in trade policy, but this is not 
necessarily the case. The overall level of protection can change also if duties remain constant, 
either because the composition of trade varies (as a result of trade policy itself or for any 
other reason) or – in the case of specific duties-  because changes in world prices (absolute or 
relative). 
 It is possible to disentangle these three causes, by computing  
[NTt-NTt-1] = [NTt-RNPt] + [RNPt-RNTt] + [RNTt-NTt-1]    [4]  





n∑ (Qit-1*Pit)  [5]  
(Appendix 3  expand this decomposition for clarity) 
Each component on the right-hand side of  [4]  measures how much the aggregate protection 
(NT) would have changed ceteris paribus. The first term, or quantity effect, estimates  the 
variation that would be caused by changes in the composition of imports if duties and prices 
remained constant. The second, or price effect, measures. The second term, or price effect, 
computes the change which would be caused by changes in prices ceteris paribus duties and 
demand structure constant. The third one, the tariff effect  estimates the variation that would 
be caused by a change in tariffs with unchanged world prices and composition of imports – 
i.e. the effects of trade policy (i). 
  20 
As we mention before NT change is usually downwards because when duties increase 
the import quantities decline and the extent of the bias depends on the elasticity of imports 
contraction. So  we can use the decomposition of changes in nominal protection in equation 
[4] to measure the elasticity of imports contraction as the ratio of  quantity decline in 
proportion to tariff increase and price changes. The smaller duty increase and bigger the 
quantity decline the bigger the downwards bias when NT change (or the index number 
problem).   
 
Table 1 
Decomposition of changes in  Total Nominal Protection [NTt-NTt-1]   









Import  elasticity  (4)= (3) / [(1)+(2)]  NTt-NTt-1 
Total 6.8 0.9 -4.1 -0.53 3.6 
Industrial goods 8.5 -0.5 - 5.8 -0.72 2.1 










Import  elasticity (4)= (3) / [(1)+(2) ] NTt-NTt-1 
Total 13.1 0.9 -3.7 -0.264 10.3 
Industrial goods 15.1 -4.4 -1.3 -0.121 9.4 
Primary Prod 11.8 6.6 -7.8 -0.438 10.6 
 
Table 1 shows the decomposition of  Nt change in Italy and Spain during  the years of 
return to protection after the respective main tariff laws of  1891 and 1887.  The first fact is 
that Italy return of protection between 1877 and 1889 measured by NT increment was more 
than 10 points and  the Spanish return of protection between 1889 and 1897 measured by NT 
was only of a  3.6 points increment.  The comparative decomposition of the NT change  
shows that the elasticity of import contraction (0.26) in Italy was less than half that of  
Spain(0.53). This mean that the Spanish return of protection  measured by   NTt-NTt-1  is 
clearly downwards bias by a strong import contraction (almost by half ) meanwhile in the 
case of Italy the contraction was less than a quarter. The elasticity behavior of the Spanish  
industrial goods was even higher (0,72) and around six fold that of Italy(0.12). In contrast 
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Italy´s primary products elasticity show elasticity coefficients slightly superior to those of 
Spain.  So it is clear that the Spanish industrial protection elasticity  during the years of return 
of protection was the main responsible of the big elasticity of  total imports and Industrial 
protection measured by NT was especially downward bias  in absolute terms and in relation 
with the Italian NT.  As it may be expected that the Spanish Industrial goods elasticity more 
than double that of Primary goods but  it is contra intuitive that in the Italian case it happened 
the other way around. Import contraction depend also of the base year tariff level. In the case 
of Spain Industrial tariff level in 1889 was higher than  for primary products and  the inverse 
situation happened for Italy  in 1877 (see Table 2).  
So evidence showed by table 1 support  the argument  that the Spanish tariff average 
change between 1889 and 1891 is specially downwards tariff of return of protection was 
implemented over a high level of protection of previous years for industrial goods and 
posterior  industrial tariffs increments show a special high elasticity for imports contraction. 
In consequence the conventional average tariff is specially downward bias or affected by the 




Alternative nominal protection indices in Spain and Italy 1870-1930 
                                 (1)               (2)                            (4)              (5)                            (6)           (7)                  








 NT / UNT 
(Spain) 
NT / UNT 
(Italy) 
1877 Total 12.7 7.3  17.7 6,8  0.72 1.07 
 
Manufact 17.6 6.5  22.4 5.4  0.78 1.2 
1889 Total 11.0 17.6  16.7 16,9  0,66 1.04 
 
Manufact 13,8 16.9  17.6 15.6  0.78 1.08 
1897 Total 14.6 18.5  26.3 16.1  0.55 1,15 
 
Manufact 18.4 13.2  32.4 15.2  0.56 0.87 
1913 Total 14.9 9.6  25.2 12.7  0.59 0,75 
 
Manufact 15.5 9.3  23.6 11.9  0.66 0.78 
1926 Total 15.5 11.9  26.6 13.7  0,58 0,87 
 
Manufact 26.0 15.0  35.9 15.7  0.72 0.95 
Sources: Spain: Tena (1999); Italy: Federico-Tena (1998) 
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Following Tena (1999) for Spain and  Federico and Tena (1998), for Italy, it is 
possible  to test the robustness of NT in contrast with the other trade measure UNT (simple 
average). Table 2 reports the results as ratio of the NT in relation with the most common 
simple average (UNT ).  Some facts could be pointed out: first that the  Spanish NT/UNT 
ratio is always lower than the Italian one; second that the downward bias of the Spanish index 
grows in the years after main tariffs laws (1897, 1913 and 1926); third that the distance 
between these ratios increases significantly in the Spanish case in 1897 in relation with 
previous years. On the other side the   Italian average ratio is only below 0.80 in 1913, but in 
the rest of the years there are no significant contraction of the ratios far from 1. The minor 
bias of the Italian NT index in 1889 and 1897 in relation to the Spanish, points out  two facts: 
first that the Spanish 1891 protectionist law contrast greater imports of the more protected 
sectors, second that Italy´s tariffs were lower and this can be the consequence of Italy 




Major components of the “Return to protection”  
Spain(1897) and Italy(1889)  
(Total protection as NT,UNT and RNT arithmetic average)  
 PRIMARY 
PRODUCTS 











1877-1897 SPAIN    34%  23%  -14%   7%    11%  16%     55%   45% 
1877-1889 ITALY    62%   9%   23%  53%    17%    7%     21%   13% 
Sources: database Spain (see Tena (1999), Italy: Federico-Tena (1998). (*) Italy 1889 average   NT y UNT 
because technical absence of RNT in the 1877 year. 
 
 
Table 3 measures the contribution of a significant group of products and sectors from the 
1870´s to the total increment of protection after the respective “return to protection” in Spain and 
Italy. The contribution of every sector is the result of the difference between the real total average of 
protection (as average of NT,UNT and RNT) and the counterfactual average estimated keeping stable 
tariffs and demand in the  sector before and after the introduction of the respective new tariff laws in 
each country (Spain 1897 and Italy 1889). The main contribution of the “return of protection” in Italy 
came from the increasing primary products tariff  and especially from a small group of products with 
clear fiscal intentions. The counterfactual of keeping Italian sugar, petroleum and coffee tariffs and 
  23 
demand at the same levels in 1877 and 1889 shows how the fiscal products are responsible for more 
than  half of the total protection increment between these two years. On the other side, the Spanish 
manufacture sector would be the main responsible of the Spanish return to protection between 1889 
and 1897 with the textile sector as leader with an outstanding contribution of almost half of the total 
tariff increase followed  by wheat as mayor contributor with less than a quarter of the total.  Inside 
manufactures, consumer goods and its main component, cotton textiles, got the best protective 
position, even thought the steel industry was protected too(see Tena(1999). In Italy, manufacture 
protection was more moderate it was and  the steel heavy industry and some chemicals products that 
improved their position inside manufacture protection(see Federico-Tena(1998).  Spanish agrarian 
protection was more stable than  that of the manufacturing sector. When the general protection index 
moderates, agriculture improves its position in relation with industry and, when protection increase, 
the opposite occurs. Spanish fiscal tariffs increased in the turn of the century but they did not affect 
this general outline of protection (Tena(1999). 
As manufactures tend to have a  the most elastic demand and fiscal products the least, 
this downward bias is especially relevant  for those periods and countries in which revenues 
products reduced or increase their share in total imports in relation with manufactures. The 
relevance of this fact comes out  in the comparative study of the Spanish and Italian case. The 
significant increase in the Spanish protection for manufactures is not detected by the average 
import weighted index meanwhile the strong increase in fiscal tariffs  is reflected completely 
by the Italian index. Manufacture tariff increase downward bias the Spanish tariff average 
index of protection,  and revenue tariffs increase bias up the Italian tariff average index as 
much as to change radically the comparative trade policy and tariff growth measures for both 
countries.   
 
4. Manufacture versus Total Protection and the Tariff Growth Debate 
Traditionally many authors have supported the idea that protection was instrumental 
to the development of Continental Europe in the late nineteenth century 15. Supporters 
suggest that tariff encourage structural change from agriculture to industry to raise output per 
worker. Tariff  may exerts two contradictory effects on growth. First one, emphasizes by 
                                                           
15
  For Europe many authors, like  Milward –Saul (1977),  Pollard (1982)  but  notably Bairoch (1976, 1989, 
1996) and recently  the already mentioned  work by O`Rourke (2000) and Clemens Williamson (2001) 
implicitly sustain this position for the period 1875 -1914. “Although import substitution policies have gradually 
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import substitutions views,  pulling resources into the manufacturing sector, it enlarge the 
scope for dynamic scale benefits, thereby increasing growth. Second one, emphasizes by free 
traders views,  imposing a static efficiency loss, the cost of which rises over the time as the 
manufacturing sector becomes larger.  
 Then in the tariff growth debate, especially for  Europe XIX century,  the important 
question is:  was protection a successful policy to foster industrialization? In consequence we 
should be more interested in the correlation between industrial tariff average and total factor 
productivity increase16. GDP per person growth has probably a good correlation with total 
productivity increase in the long run, but perhaps total tariff average  is not  a good proxy for 
relative industrial tariff average.  An increment in the total average to protect agricultural 
producers in the aftermath of the Great grain invasion (O`Rourke (1997), or the increment of  
exotic goods tariffs for fiscal reasons between 1870 to 1914,  suggest again caution in the use 
of total tariff average as protection indices in the tariff growth debate. Total tariff average  
may not only provide little information  for interpreting the tariff mechanism causation to 
growth but perhaps an erroneous one .  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
lost their shine over the postwar period, their reputation has remained intact for the late nineteenth century” 
(Irwin (2001) p. 1  
16
 Edwads (1998) study  on  “openness and growth” runs regressions of total factor productivity growth on nine 
alternative indicators of openness (as well as initial income and a measure of schooling). 




Sources: GDP Growth rates per person Maddison (1995), table 1.3, p.23; Manufacture & Total tariff level  
1870`s see Table 3.  
Figure 9
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Sources :  Growth rates Real GDP: Maddison (1995) p.23, Tariff levels 1913, see Table 3 plus United Kingdon  
an a division between Austria and Hungary . 
figure 12
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Bairoch hypothesis that tariffs were positively associated with growth in late 19th 
century is related only with European countries but has been used for other geographical 
areas. The positive correlation founded recently by O´Rourcke (2000)  suggests, following 
Bairoch,  that tariffs may have played a causal role in promoting growth in the years previous 
to First World War even if results appear very influenced by the country sample 17.  This 
suggestion has been questioned,  in terms of regional asymmetry,  by  Clements &Williamson 
(2001) that show how tariffs had a negative low impact on growth in the European periphery 
and were only positive associated in Rich European Offshoots.  Association between growth 
and tariffs in  Continental Europe seems, positive but very low and spurious. 
 In previous figures we have used Bairoch`s  estimation  of manufacture tariff levels 
for 15 European countries in 1875 to construct two samples of countries, Core and Periphery, 
according to their income level18.  Figure 9 and  10  test rudely main Core European countries 
association between  total and manufacture tariff level, respectively, with growth. In figure 9 
the association  between initial total tariff average in 1870 and the respective rate of growth 
for the period 1870-1913 appear clearly  positive  (R2= 0.52, without UK R2= 0.65) in relation 
with a doubtful low positive association between manufacture tariffs and growth ( R2= 0.27, 
without clear outliers), for the same group of countries  in figure 10. Figure 11 and 12 
reproduce the contrast between total and manufacture tariffs in association with growth for 
the European Periphery. Both figures show  high negative correlations. Higher total tariffs 
appear strongly associated with slow growth (R2= 0.77, without Hungary R2= 0.87) and 
manufacture tariffs seems to confirm this negative association (R2= 0.66 ). So, In one side, 
rich European countries growth is associated with total tariff but not with manufacture tariff 
increase; and in the other side, poor Europeans countries growth appear negatively associated 
either with total than with manufacture tariff increase.   
The other important point discussed bellow is the association between relative 
manufacture protection and growth. Increment in total protection may be caused by 
                                                           
17
 “It appears that Bairoch hypothesis (that tariffs were positively associated with growth in late 19th century) 
holds up remarkably well”.  p.  O´Rourcke (2000). The data set cover ten countries, three in the New World 




  Core European countries are defined according to Maddison (1995): those that in 1870 had  GDP per Capita  
(international 1990 dollars)  equal or superior to France (Core: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France,  Germany, 
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increments in agrarian or “fiscal” protection and in consequence may  imply a reduction in 
relative manufacture protection. Figures 13 and 14 show the association between growth and 
the ratio of manufacture/total tariff for the same group of  rich and poor European countries 
than the other figures below. Core Europeans countries  growth (figure 13),  show  the higher 
industrial/total tariff ratio associated with slow growth (without UK, a strong negative 
correlation R2= - 0,87) in apparent contradiction with previous positive correlation of growth 
with total  tariffs. On the contrary, poor Europeans apparent strong negative growth 
association with tariffs became completely spurious  when it is associated with the relative 
manufacture/total tariff ratio (figure 14).  
 
Table 3 











1870`s Manufact. (1)   Total (2)  (3) = (1) / (2) 1913   Manufact.(4) Total (5) (6) = (4) / (5) 
Austria 15 5.2 2.83 Austria 14.6 22.8 0.64 
Belgium 9 1.5 6 Belgium 8.7 14.2 0.61 
Denmark 15 12 1.25 Denmark* 14 9 1.55 
France 12 5.8 2.07 France  12.9 23.6 0.55 
Germany 4 7.3 0.55 Germany 8.5 16.7 0.51 
Netherlands 3 0.6 5 Netherlands*  3  
Switzerland 4 3.6 1.11 Switzerland 7.6 10.5 0.72 
UK 0.1 5.3 0.019 UK* 0.1* 4.2 (2) 0.02 
EU(Core)    EU (Core)    
       
 
Hungary 15 5.2 2.83 Hungary 14.6 2.,8 0.64 
Italy 8 11.1 0.72 Italy 12.6 24.8 0.51 
Norway 2 11.8 0,17 Norway*  11.4  
Portugal 20 32.4 0.62 Portugal(2)  24.7  
Russia 15 19 0,79 Russia 79 7.5 1.09 
Spain 15.3 16.6 0.92 Spain 35.7 37 0,96 
Sweden 3 10.3 0,29 Sweden 22,5 27.6 0.82 
EU(Periphery)    Serbia 15 22.2 0.68 
    Rumania 22.5 30.3 0.74 
   
 Bulgaria 18.7 22.8 0.82 
   
 Finland 36.4 35 1.04 
 
Sources : (1) Bairoch (1989), Table 5 p.42; (2) Mitchell (1981) Custom revenue & Import value; (4) Liepman 
(1938) Table IV A p.413 Industrial Manufactured goods potential tariff levels;  (5) Liepman (1938) Table IV B 
p.415 General potential levels with fiscal goods included. * League of Nations(1927) arithmetic averages 
sample.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Netherland, Switzerland, UK) that had 56% of  the UK level (the next Sweden  with the 50%). Peripheral 
countries the rest (ordered by income): Sweden, Italy, Spain, Norway, Hungary, Portugal, Russia.  
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  Table 3  use  Bairoch (1989)  and Liepman (1938) manufacture tariff average  
estimations for the respective years of  1875 and 1913 in relation with total average19.  
Apparently, in the first half of 1870´s, before the years of return to protection, rich European 
countries  had a remarkable more protected manufactured sector than the rest of the economy. 
Amazing, relative manufacture protection in the same years in the European periphery was in 
the other way around.   Even if the data,  showed in table 3, has some comparability  
problems, it suggest that rich European countries relative manufacture tariffs ratio was 
reduced from 1870´s to First War World.  What this crude  ratio evolution may show?  a) 
That the stimulus of  industrial protection  to shift resources out of agriculture and into 
manufacturing was reduced during the years of return of protection in most rich European 
countries b) That the ratio between manufacture tariffs and  primary product tariffs worsened  
because some primary products tariffs used by fiscal reasons increased faster than the rest 
agricultural and industrial duties but the stimulus to shifting resources out of agriculture may 
be increased. Revenue and protective products tariffs appear, again relevant to the tariff 
growth debate.   
Evidence showed in this section  appear quite contrary to Bairoch (1977,1989,1996) 
traditional hypothesis on the positive role that protection played to foster Continental Europe 
industrialization before First War World. Nevertheless, the proposal of this section it is more 
a suggestion to additional research to explicit the relation between industrial, agricultural and 
fiscal tariffs to clear the mechanism of causation between tariffs and growth. As Irwin (2001) 
mention correlation between tariffs and growth are only suggestive of causality. To establish 
causal relationship it is necessary to “determine if high tariffs stimulated growth by shifting 
resources out of agriculture and into manufacturing”(abstract). 
  
Conclusion 
This study suggests caution on the use of average tariffs for comparative commercial 
history. Firstly, because in practice there are no pure fiscal tariffs neither pure protective 
                                                           
19
  Manufacture tariff average of  Bairoch and  Liepman are not  directly comparable across the time because 
they use different methodology. Bairoch estimation  use a sample of 14 different manufactured products duties 
in 1875 weighted by import values average of 1869-71(as usual he is not much more  explicit about his 
estimations). Liepman  methodology is very well known. He use a simple average of 61 manufactured products 
in 1913 over  export prices  in the same year . On the contrary the ratio between  Manufacture and total tariff 
average in each period is perfectly comparable because both follow a similar methodology with some explicit 
exceptions in 1913. 
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ones, but those who have a small elasticity of demand (fiscal ones) have much less impact on 
welfare than those with high elasticity. The strong and changing presence of the so-called 
fiscal products throughout trade history makes this point important in the analysis of the 
comparative evolution of the international commercial policies and in the appreciation of the 
relative industrial , agricultural tariff ratio. So we need to know the share of fiscal tariffs  and 
excise compensation through the time to qualify, at least, the average tariff trend. Nye´s 
provocative tariff average comparison is a good cautionary tale in this direction. Secondly,  
average tariffs  estimated may contain an important bias as measurement of protection 
because of classic index number problems. As manufactures usually have the most elastic 
demand products and foodstuff  products the least, this downward bias is especially relevant 
for those periods and countries with high levels of manufacturing protection, and  also for 
those periods and countries in which revenues products reduce or increase their share in total 
imports relative to manufactures. Third, this paper also  investigate the mechanism causation 
between tariffs and growth. New evidence suggest different correlation between total and 
manufacture tariffs and growth.  Association between tariff and growth reveals a 
development asymmetry  specify for the case of Europe. Bairoch´s hypothesis  on tariffs 
fostering Continental Europe industrialization at the end of nineteenth  century appear not to 
holds up for peripheral or even core European countries. This paper  suggest caution in the 
use of the conventional average tariffs and the need to estimate some kind  of  separate cross 
country  industrial, primary and fiscal products tariff average as a necessary contribution for a 
better defined tariff growth debate. 
In an already mentioned  paper  O`Rourke recognize that  “the average tariff measure 
which I am using is extremely crude, and may in some cases be misleading, for reasons 
highlighted earlier….. The construction of a superior index of protection, on an uniform 
basis, for as many countries as possible during the late 19th century should be a major 
research priority” O`Rourke (2000), p.17.  This paper has been stimulated for O`Rourke´s 
statement and it contribution consist on  clarification on the main variables that influence  the 
accuracy of the tariff average and the different implications of it extended use for the tariff 
growth debate. This paper also suggest a research agenda to investigate the mechanism 
between trade policies and growth.  
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Sources: see Appendix 1 
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APPENDIX 2 
Sources and methods on tariffs revenues an fiscal products 
 
UK Data on import value and customs revenue 
Total import value and total costume revenue from 1827 to 1913 : Imlah (1958).   
 
Fiscal products import value and costume revenue for: coffee, tea, sugar, tobacco, spirits and  
wine:  
-Quantities  and revenues from:  House of Commons(1898). “Customs tariffs of the United 
Kingdom from 1800-1897” Vol. 85, London, and Board of Trade, British Parlamentary 
Papers 1890-1913, yearly.  
-Prices for coffee, tea, sugar, tobacco, spirits and  wine before 1854, using declared values 
from the official trade statistics  of 1854 and prices index from Sauerbeck (1886) “import 
price index (omitting cotton& wool)”.  
-Quantities and prices and revenues 1890-1913,  Board of Trade (various years) and Annual 
Statement of Trade, British Parliamentary Papers (various years). 
 
UK Fiscal data on Excise revenue and Production  
1841-1913 
for Spirits and Beer & Ale from House of Commons (1898)  
Prices: Spirits and Beer export prices from Board of Trade (various  years). 
 
France Data on import value and customs  revenue 
Total import value and total costume revenue from 1827 to 1913, from Levy-Leboyer & 
Bourguignon (1977). Imported Quantities and tariffs revenues for cocoa, sugar, coffee, 
petroleum; (1827-1895) Tableu General du Comerce de la France from (1896-1913 ) Tableu 
General du Comerce de la France et de la Navigations (Comerce Special).  
 
German Data on import value and customs  revenue 
Total import value and total costume revenue from 1880 to 1913, from Mitchell (1981)  
Data on customs  revenue of coffee, tobacco, and petroleum from Statistisches Jahrbuch fur 
das Deutches Reich (1880-1913). 
Data on import values of coffee, tobacco and petroleum from Der Auswartige Handel 
Deutchlands in den Jahren (various years). 
 
Italy  Data on import value and customs  revenue  
Italy total revenue from1864-1872:  Ragioneria Generale dello Stato 1969 tab. 12 
(Riscossioni complessive) col "dogane".  1873-1913:  Repaci, R.  (1962), pp.84-85 e 208. 
Total Import value and Import value and tariff revenue from sugar, coffee, petroleum from 
Movimento Commerciale dall Italia (yearly). 
 
Spain Data on import value and customs  revenue 
Total import value between 1850-1913 new serie estimated by Prados de la Escosura(1986). 
Total revenue from Estadísticas del Comercio Exterior (yearly). The revenue of a tax 
imposed on foreign sugar and paid in frontier between 1882-1898 is also included.  Import 
value and tariff revenue between 1850-1913 of sugar, coffee, cacao, petroleum  from 
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Estadísticas del Comercio Exterior (yearly). Sugar revenue 1882-1898 Martín: (1982), 
Cuadro c.3, p.349. 
 
  37 
                                                               APPENDIX 3 




n∑  (Qit *Tit) /
i=1




n∑ (Qit-1*Tit) / 
i=1






n∑ (Qit-1*Pit)  [5]  
 
[NTt-NTt-1] =   [NTt-RNPt]     +    [RNPt-RNTt]    +    [RNTt-NTt-1]      [4]  
 
[NTt-NTt-1] =  Quantity Eff.   +      Price Eff.        +       Tariff Eff.           [4]     
   
 
 Quantity Eff. =    [
i=1
n∑  (Qit *Tit) / 
i=1
n∑  (Qit * Pit) ]  -  [
i=1
n∑ (Qit-1*Tit)  / 
i=1
n∑ (Qit-1* Pit)  ]  
 




n∑ (Qit-1*Pit) ]  -  [=
i=1
n∑ (Qit-1*Tit) / 
i=1
n∑ (Qit-1*Pit-1 ] 
 




n∑ (Qit-1*Pit-1)]  - [
i=1
n∑  (Qit-1 *Tit-1) /
i=1
n∑  (Qit-1*Pit-1)]     
                                                           
i
  The problem has been recently dealt with by Crucini (1994). However, his approach is less accurate insofar as 
it takes into account the duty and price effects only. 
